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DEFENDING BATTERED WOMEN: EVERYTHING SHE
SAYS MAY BE USED AGAINST THEM
IRVIN B. NODLAND*
This article discusses practical techniques for presenting "bat-
tered woman syndrome" evidence in the courtroom on behalf of
women who have killed their mates. Most of the theoretical litera-
ture on this subject argues that battered woman syndrome should
not be considered as a defense by itself but should be used to sup-
port "self-defense" as a justification for the homicidal act.1 To use
such evidence otherwise (e.g., to claim excuse or diminished
mental capacity), it is argued, perpetuates age-old stereotypes of
women as "crazy," "weak," "dominated," and in need of protec-
tion by the legal system. 2
It is the thesis of this article that promotion of historical ste-
reotypes may very well be an immediate consequence. The prob-
lem is that hard-headed insistence that diminished capacity
defenses not be used may seriously limit the kinds of evidence the
court will allow and may cost individual women now on trial ten,
twenty or thirty years in prison and, in some cases, life. 3
A reading of the 130 or more reported appellate cases that
have developed in the past thirteen years since battered woman
syndrome evidence was first presented in the American court-
room 4 reveals appalling injustices to women, because the closet of
clothes that makes up the wardrobe of family violence cannot, in
some judges' minds, be made to fit into one straightjacket of tradi-
* Partner with the firm of Nodland & Dickson, Bismarck, North Dakota. B.S.,
Dickinson State Teachers College, 1975; M.A., University of Texas, El Paso, 1961; L.L.B.,
Yale, 1964.
1. CYNTHIA K. GILLESPIE, JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE 159-60 (1989) ("[T]here is no such
thing as a 'battered woman defense' to a homicide charge. The sole purpose of such
testimony is to help the jury to understand why the woman reasonably believed she had to
act as she did to defend herself.").
2. Elizabeth M. Schneider, 9 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 195, 214- 15 (1986).
3. See, e.g., Martin v. State, 501 So. 2d 1313 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Chapman v.
State, 386 S.E.2d 129 (Ga. 1989); State v. Anderson, 785 S.W.2d 596 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990);
State v. Martin, 666 S.W.2d 895 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); State v. Clark, 377 S.E.2d 54 (N.C.
1989); State v. Jackson, 435 N.W.2d 893 (Neb. 1989); State v. Kelly, 655 P.2d 1202 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1982); State v. Leaphart, 673 S.W.2d 870 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983); State v. Wickline,
399 S.E.2d 42 (W. Va. 1990); State v. Feltrop, 803 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1991).
4. Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626 (D.C. 1979), appeal after remand, 455
A.2d 893 (D.C. 1983). The Ibn-Tamas trial court excluded proferred expert testimony on
battered woman syndrome. On appeal, the court of appeals remanded the case, since the
record was not clear whether the trial court properly analyzed the proferred testimony.
Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626 (D.C. 1979). On remand, the trial court stated
that it had considered all pertinent factors. The case was then affirmed on appeal. Ibn-
Tamas v. United States, 455 A.2d 893 (D.C. 1983).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
tional self-defense law.5
"Battered woman syndrome" refers to a set of common char-
acteristics unique to women who are physically or psychologically
abused by their mates.6 It does not appear as a separate category
of mental illness in current diagnostic criteria developed by the
American Psychiatric Association.7
The most commonly quoted and widely accepted explanation
of the common characteristics making up the syndrome is that of
Dr. Lenore Walker." Dr. Walker's "cycle of violence" theory con-
sists of three phases: a tension-building phase, a release through
acute battering, and a final cycle of apparent contrition and
remorse by the batterer.9
After Ibn-Tamas v. United States,'° which contained Dr.
Walker's initial postulation of the battered woman syndrome,
American courts, with varying degrees of understanding, strug-
gled to apply the concept to difficult cases in which battered
women had killed their mates. In State v. Kelly," the Supreme
Court of New Jersey condensed Dr. Walker's work, setting forth
the various stages faced by the battered woman in the cycle of
violence.' 2 According to Dr. Walker, during the "tension-building
stage," the battered woman attempts to placate the battering male
to avoid escalating violence.' 3 The second stage of the battering
cycle, the "acute battering incident," occurs following a "trigger-
ing event," often provoked by some event in the battering male's
life."' A characteristic of the third stage is "extreme contrition and
loving behavior" on the battering male's behalf. During this stage
the male will ask for forgiveness and promise repentance. How-
5. See, e.g., Clenny v. State, 344 S.E.2d 216 (Ga. 1986); Fultz v. State, 439 N.E.2d 659
(Ind. Ct. App. 1982); State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989); State v. Aucoin, 756 S.W.2d
705 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988); Strong v. State, 307 S.E.2d 912 (Ga. 1983); Chapman v. State,
367 S.E.2d 541 (Ga. 1988); State v. Torres, 393 S.E.2d 535 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990).
6. LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN xiv-xv (1979).
7. See DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (DSM III) (3d
ed. rev. 1987). However, the syndrome has been recognized as a subcategory of post-
traumatic stress disorder. For a brief discussion of an ongoing battle between feminist
mental health professionals and the American Psychiatric Association concerning diagnostic
criteria for battered women syndrome, see LENORE E. WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE 48 n.*
(1989).
8. LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATrERED WOMAN SYNDROME 75-85 (1984).
9. Id. at 95-96.
10. 407 A.2d 626 (D.C. 1979), appeal after remand, 455 A.2d 893 (D.C. 1983).
11. 478 A.2d 364 (N.J. 1984).
12. State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 371-72 (N.J. 1984).
13. Id. at 371. At this stage, the male behavior is typified by "minor battering incidents
and verbal abuse." Id.
14. Id. While the serious violence is usually triggered by an event in the male's life, it
may be provoked by the woman, who "can no longer tolerate or control her phase one
anger and anxiety." Id.
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ever, the common progression following this phase, which may last
several months, is re-initiation of stage one of the violence cycle.' 5
Dr. Walker asserts that the "cyclical nature" of the violence
explains the failure of the battered woman to seek a new life.'
6
The apparent devotion of the violent male perpetuates hope in
the battered woman for eventual success in the relationship.
17
Moreover, the battered woman may perceive the violence as
"normal," comparing the battering cycle to her own childhood.'
Other women, according to Dr. Walker, "sink into a state of psy-
chological paralysis" finding their situation unalterable.' 9 Lack of
material resources and a belief in the "omnipotence" of the bat-
tering male combine to create in the battered woman a sense that
there is "no place to go." 2° In addition, there is a typical unwill-
ingness to confide in the outside world.2'
Dr. Walker states that the following traits are exhibited by the
battered woman: "low self-esteem, traditional beliefs about the
home, the family, and the female sex role, tremendous feelings of
guilt that their marriages are failing, and the tendency to accept
responsibility for the batterer's actions."' 22 These traits, combined
with the tendency in battered women to be "trapped by their own
fear," constitute the battered woman syndrome.23
Battered women kill because there comes a time when it
appears no other remedy will save their lives. The problem for
the defense in such cases is that this point in time is often not coin-
cidental with the stage when severe beatings occur. The repeat-
edly battered woman may sense during the tension-building stage
that a severe beating is imminent and that the consequences to
her or members of her family will be life-threatening. After a
beating is over, even if the batterer lies in bed sleeping, 24 the bat-
tered woman may be convinced that the beatings will most assur-
edly come again and that next time she will not survive.
All traditional laws of self-defense require, as one element,
15. Id.
16. Id. at 371-72.
17. Kelly, 478 A.2d at 371-72 (citing ROGER LANGLEY & RICHARD C. LEVY, WIFE
BEATING: THE SILENT CRISIS 112-14 (1977)).
18. Id. at 372 (citing BATTERED WOMEN, A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE 60 (Maria Roy ed. 1977); DEL MARTIN, BATTERED WIVES 60 (1981)).
19. Id.
20. Id. (citing LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 75 (1979)).
21. Id. Women may be unwilling to confide in outsiders "either out of shame and
humiliation, fear of reprisal by their husbands, or the feeling they will not be believed." Id.
22. Kelly, 478 A.2d at 372.
23. Id.
24. See, e.g., State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811 (N.D. 1983).
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that the defendant prove she killed because serious bodily injury
or death was "imminent" to herself or another for whom she feels
responsible.25 Most of the cases in which the defense has failed
have been the result of a failure to satisfy this requirement of
"imminence" of the threat. Sometimes the homicidal act seems so
far removed from any imminent threat that the court will not
even allow self-defense instructions which could promote a possi-
ble jury acquittal.2 6 In other cases, the jury is simply unable to
accept that an act of killing so seemingly remote in time should
ever be allowed to satisfy the right to self-defense.
A reading of the reported battered woman cases reveals just
how difficult it is to get a battered woman's story told. In the
usual defense, an expert is employed. If the expert's testimony is
allowed, it is used to overcome historical and stereotypical notions
of duty to retreat: she should have left; there were courts, commu-
nity resources and law enforcement personnel that could have
helped; she lied to the first officer on the scene; she seemed to lack
remorse; there really was not an imminent threat; and a host of
25. North Dakota's self-defense statute provides:
A person is justified in using force upon another person to defend himself against
danger or imminent unlawful bodily injury, sexual assault, or detention by such
other person except that:
1. A person is not justified in using force for the purpose of resisting arrest,
execution of process, or other performance of duty by a public servant under
color of law but excessive force may be resisted.
2. A person is not justified in using force if:
a. He intentionally provokes unlawful action by another person to cause
bodily injury or death to such other person; or
b. He has entered into a mutual combat with another person or is the initial
aggressor unless he is resisting force which is clearly excessive in the
circumstances. A person's use of defensive force after he withdraws
from an encounter and indicates to the other person that he has done so
is justified if the latter nevertheless continues or menaces unlawful
action.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-03 (1985).
Section 12.1-05-07 of the North Dakota Century Code sets out "limits on the use of
force." N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-07 (1985). In summary, the section states that only such
force as is necessary may be used. Deadly force is permitted when authorized by law, when
used for self-defense or defense of others, to prevent commission of a felony in a dwelling or
workplace under the actor's control, to prevent escapes of persons in custody, and when
used by physicians under prescribed conditions. Id.
26. See Fultz v. State, 439 N.E.2d 659, 663 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982); State v. Norman, 378
S.E.2d 8, 13-14 (N.C. 1989); State v. Torres, 393 S.E.2d 535, 539-40 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990);
State v. Anderson, 785 S.W.2d 596, 599-600 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); State v. Walker, 700 P.2d
1168, 1173 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985).
27. A case illustrating the confusion, misunderstanding and stereotypical male
response to horrendous facts of battering is State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989). The
Norman court appears to have been unable to grasp the concept of how battering husbands
kill their mates on the installment plan and that there comes a day when some battered
women first realize the final installment is coming due. Other courts seeming unable to
grasp the concept include State v. Torres, 393 S.E.2d 535 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990); Norris v.
State, 295 S.E.2d 321 (Ga. 1982); Fielder v. State, 683 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985).
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other obstacles that seem to point to motive, anger, revenge,
cover-up and murder. Mostly, the expert is used to tell the
woman's story. The leading authority in the field has written:
Once battered women are allowed to speak, they will be
able to tell their own stories. And to know a battered
woman's story is to understand, without a doubt, why she
has killed.28
This article suggests one inexpensive and effective way to get a
battered woman's story told in the courtroom. It is not without
controversy or risk. It has been used in a number of state and fed-
eral courtrooms in North Dakota, in all instances successfully.
The procedure suggested here has some bothersome depar-
tures from traditional defense lawyering in that it suggests an
abandonment of the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, and
it places defense cards face up on the table so as to provide maxi-
mum opportunity for rebuttal and preparation by the prosecution.
In return, all that can be said is that the procedure suggested here
works. Dr. Walker has argued that there should be "special legal
procedures for battered women... legitimized [to]... recognize
and validate the world view of women as well as of men .... 29
This author agrees, but until such time as those procedures are
developed, one must consider that which works and which in fact
overcomes evidence- limiting rulings and narrow jury instructions
that far too often result in serious felony convictions.
Not every lawyer will defend a battered woman during her
legal career. Not doing so, however, is more apt to be by choice
than from lack of opportunity. Domestic violence is the single
largest cause of injury to women in the United States today.30 It
contributes more injury to women than all of the automobile acci-
dents, muggings and rapes combined.3 ' Major efforts are being
made by shelters and rights organizations to raise public conscious-
ness and outrage, but the causes of domestic violence seem deeply
imbedded in our psyches and in our institutions. The male vio-
lence that thrives from century to century seems nurtured by a
pervasive and insidious belief by both sexes that it is the nature of
things that males dominate and females submit. Ninety-five per-
28. LENORE E. WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE 14-15 (1989).
29. Id. at 14.
30. U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, FAMILY VIOLENCE: AN
OVERVIEW, Jan. 1991, at 5 [hereinafter FAMILY VIOLENCE].
31. Id.
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cent of the victims of domestic violence are women.32
Societal and governmental response to "crime" has become a
central core of political debate. The "war on drugs" commands a
cabinet level "czar." Domestic violence does not receive the same
attention, even though virtually every incident of domestic vio-
lence is a crime, frequently a felony.
Violence occurs at least once in two-thirds of all marriages. 33
After analyzing data from many sources, Pagelow concluded that
twenty-five to thirty percent of all women are beaten at least once
in the course of their intimate relationships. 4 Domestic violence
exists in all levels of community, wealth, education, occupation
and status, with strong evidence that it is somewhat higher among
middle and upper-income groups. 35 Estimates by the FBI indicate
that only one out of ten incidents ever gets reported.3 6
One-third of all women slain in this country are killed by their
husbands or partners. It is estimated that between three and
four-million American women are battered each year by their hus-
bands or partners.38 Of these, more than a million seek medical
attention.3 9 Twenty percent of all women presenting themselves
to hospital emergency rooms do so as a result of injuries sustained
in family violence. 40 As many as eighty percent of all women filing
for divorce list physical abuse as one of their complaints.41
North Dakota is not immune from these harsh statistics. In
the first six months of 1991, 2532 incidents of domestic violence
were reported to eighteen crisis intervention centers.42 Of these,
1352 were victims reporting for the first time.43 This level of vio-
lence represented a twenty-nine percent increase over the
32. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, REPORT TO THE NATION
ON CRIME AND JUSTICE, THE DATA, Oct. 1983, at 21.
33. THE ABUSIVE PARTNER, AN ANALYSIS OF DOMESTIC BA'TTERING 259 (Maria Roy
ed., 1982).
34. FAMILY VIOLENCE, supra note 30, at 4-5.
35. Jeanne-Marie Bates, Comment, Expert Testimony on the Battered Woman
Syndrome in Maryland, 50 MD. L. REV. 920, 926 n.35 (1991).
36. J. ROSENBERG, 911-FAMILY VIOLENCE: HELPING THE VICTIM 65 (1986).
37. FAMILY VIOLENCE supra note 30, at 5.
38. National Clearinghouse on Domestic Violence, Wife Abuse in the Medical Setting:
An Introduction for Health Personnel, Monograph Series No. 7, Washington, D.C., U.S.
Govt. Printing Office vii (Apr. 1981).
39. Evan Stark & Anne Flitcraft, Medical Therapy as Repression: 'The Case of Battered
Women' HEALTH & MED., Summer/Fall 29-32 (1982).
40. Evan Stark, et al., Medicine and Patriarchal Violence: "The Social Construction of
a Private Event," 9(3) INTL. J. OF HEALTH SERVS. (1979).
41. Laura Crites & Donna Coker, 27 THE JUDGES' J., Spring 1988, at 9-10.
42. North Dakota Council on Abused Women's Services, 10(1) THE DAKOTAH




reported incidents for the first six months of 1990. 44 Of this total,
less than fifteen percent apply to the courts for protective
orders.45
In defending battered women who have killed, expert testi-
mony must first teach the jury insights of the type Dr. Walker
taught the New Jersey Supreme Court in Kelly. The second step,
however, is to demonstrate that this particular defendant histori-
cally had experienced the components making up the battered
woman syndrome and, accordingly, acted logically, reasonably and
legally in taking a life to preserve her own.
If the battleground to be chosen by the defense is a biographi-
cal and psychological profile, what counsel will almost always
encounter is a mine field. There will always be a rich inventory of
information helpful to the defense, but there will also be incidents
seeming to point to guilt and nonconforming psychological
glitches that threaten to blow up and dismember the defense with
each step it takes.
It is in the very nature of battered families that there will have
been a multitude of dysfunctional incidents. The defendant may
have waited until her spouse or lover was asleep. There may be
evidence that she threatened, stabbed, assaulted or shot someone
before. She may have a previous criminal record. She may have
been on drugs or alcohol. She may have been told by the police to
call if she needed help. When she signed a complaint on previous
occasions, her husband was arrested and convicted, so why didn't
she call the police this time? There may have been a substantial
insurance policy. She may have had an affair. She may have told
someone she was going to kill him. The story she told the police
immediately after her arrest may have varied substantially from
what she is saying now. The story she told immediately following
her arrest may be difficult to fit into the physical facts developed
by the police investigator. She may have hired someone else to do
it for her. There may be a seeming lack of remorse. She may have
signed statements in the past at police stations which gave some
explanation other than beatings to explain blackened eyes or bro-
ken arms. There may be "histories" taken by doctors explaining in
great detail the causes of the prior injuries-all inconsistent with
what she now says really happened on those occasions. Children
loyal to Dad (or angry over his death) deny that Mother is telling
44. Id.
45. See id. (Of the 2532 incidents reported, only 377 protective order petitions were
filed.).
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the truth (she didn't have to go that far). She may be physically
larger than he was.
But the story must be told and it must be told completely and
fairly. How do you do this without becoming bogged down in end-
less pre-trial and trial battles over (1) differences between what is a
justification and what is an excuse; (2) is this self-defense or dimin-
ished mental capacity; (3) is this a mental defense or just a claim of
having a state of mind not capable of committing the crime; (4)
was this duress; 46 and (5) did the Castle Doctrine47 obviate her
duty to retreat? The only important thing is to get her story told
and to educate the jury on the battered woman syndrome.
A majority of courts now permit expert testimony to describe
the phenomenon of battered woman syndrome regardless of
whether presented as support for the argument that the defend-
ant acted reasonably in exercising self-defense, or whether
presented as a post-traumatic syndrome-type defense bearing on
the issue of diminished mental capacity. a In the only battered
woman syndrome case to reach the North Dakota Supreme Court,
State v. Leidholm,49 it was held that such testimony is to be consid-
46. State v. Rohrich, No. 569 (N.D. Dist. Ct. Oct. 9, 1975). This case was tried to a jury
in Kidder County District Court, resulted in an acquittal of murder. Rohrich pre-dated the
battered woman syndrome theory and was defended under a claim of duress. The facts of
that case fit "battered woman syndrome" theory in classic proportion. Interview with
Daniel J. Chapman, Bismarck, North Dakota defense attorney (January 1992).
47. The "Castle Doctrine" proclaims that no one is required to retreat from his or her
"castle" to avoid harm. The doctrine is codified in North Dakota and states as follows:
"[N]o person is required to retreat from his dwelling, or place of work, unless he was the
original aggressor or is assailed by a person who he knows also dwells or works there." N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-07(2XbX2) (1985).
48. See State v. Steele, 359 S.E.2d 558, 563-64 (W. Va. 1987); Terry v. State, 467 So. 2d
761,763 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Hawthorne v. State, 408 So. 2d 801,806-07 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1982); Strong v. State, 307 S.E.2d 912, 913 (Ga. 1983); Smith v. State, 277 S.E.2d 678,
683 (Ga. 1981); People v. Minnis, 455 N.E.2d 209, 217 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983); State v. Stewart,
763 P.2d 572, 576 (Kan. 1988); State v. Hodges, 716 P.2d 563, 570 (Kan. 1986); State v.
Anaya, 438 A.2d 892, 894 (Me. 1981); State v. Baker, 424 A.2d 171, 172-73 (N.H. 1980); State
v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 381 (N.J. 1984); State v. Gallegos, 719 P.2d 1268, 1273-74 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1986); People v. Torres, 488 N.Y.S.2d 358, 362-63 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985); State v.
Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 819 (N.D. 1983); State v. Thomas, 468 N.E.2d 763, 765 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1983); State v. Hill, 339 S.E.2d 121, 122 (S.C. 1986); State v. Kelly, 685 P.2d 564,
570 (Wash. 1984); State v. Allery, 682 P.2d 312, 315-16 (Wash. 1984); State v. Felton, 329
N.W.2d 161, 165-67 (Wis. 1983); State v. Hennum, 441 N.W.2d 793, 798-99 (Minn. 1989);
People v. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167, 179-80 (Ct. App. 1984); Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407
A.2d 626, 633-35 (D.C. 1979), appeal after remand, 455 A.2d 893 (D.C. 1983); Chapman v.
State, 367 S.E.2d 541, 543 (Ga. 1988); State v. Hundley, 693 P.2d 475, 477-78 (Kan. 1985);
Commonwealth v. Craig, 783 S.W.2d 387, 389 (Ky. 1990); State v. Clay, 779 S.W.2d 673,
676-77 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); State v. Williams, 787 S.W.2d 308, 313 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990);
State v. Norman, 366 S.E.2d 586 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988), rev'd, 378 S.E.2d 8, 11 (N.C. 1989);
State v. Koss, 551 N.E.2d 970, 973-74 (Ohio 1990); State v. Moore, 695 P.2d 985, 987-88 (Or.
Ct. App. 1985); Commonwealth v. Stonehouse, 555 A.2d 772, 782-84 (Pa. 1989); State v.
Leaphart, 673 S.W.2d 870, 872 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983); Fielder v. State, 756 S.W.2d 309,
319-20 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
49. 334 N.W.2d 811 (N.D. 1983).
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ered as it bears on the reasonableness of the defendant's belief that
force was necessary. More importantly, the court stated that the
issue of "reasonableness" was to be "viewed from the standpoint of
a person whose mental and physical characteristics are like the
accused's and who sees what the accused sees and knows what the
accused knows."50
In order to see what a battered woman sees and to know what
a battered woman knows, her life must be re-created in the court-
room. A number of major obstacles stand in the way of accom-
plishing this task:
1. The defendant is depressed, angry and oftentimes
uncommunicative.
2. The defense lawyer is afraid to let the whole story be
told because the defendant has said and done things
that seem indicative of guilt in order to survive in a
dysfunctional setting.
3. If the facts on their face seem to contradict traditional
self-defense or diminished capacity scenarios, the trial
judge may not even let the story be told.
HOW TO GET THE STORY TOLD
The standard for proving lack of criminal responsibility in
North Dakota is set out in North Dakota Century Code section
12.1-04.1-01. The likelihood of acquittal on such grounds in any
case that goes to trial is highly improbable.-" Nevertheless, when a
defendant gives notice of intent to raise such a defense, 2 certain
procedural steps are implemented.53  Once the defendant has
given notice, the prosecution moves, pursuant to its statutory
authority, to have the defendant examined by a mental health pro-
50. State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 818 (N.D. 1983) (citation omitted).
51. This author conducted a somewhat cursory inquiry approximately five years ago
and could find only three North Dakota cases, tried by juries, where there was a finding of
not guilty by reason of a mental condition.
52. Required by N.D.R. CRIM. P. 12.2. The Century Code requires that a defendant
give notice to the prosecution if he intends to assert lack of criminal responsibility as a
defense or if he intends to introduce expert testimony on lack of required state of mind.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-04.1-03 to -04 (1985). In State v. Vogel, the court refused to allow
expert testimony on Ms. Vogel's "state of mind" but received in chambers an extensive
"offer of proof" from a defense psychologist. State v. Vogel, No. 7276 (N.D. Dist. Ct. Nov. 8,
1989). Ms. Vogel was convicted of murder and received a 10-year deferred imposition of
sentence. The case was not defended as either self-defense or diminished capacity, but
rather as an accidental shooting during a threat meant to scare.
53. Under § 12.1-04.1-05 of the North Dakota Century Code, the prosecutor may
request and insist upon an examination of the defendant by a mental health professional
once the defendant has given notice of her intent to rely upon a diminished capacity
defense. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-04.1-05 (1985).
1992]
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fessional. The scope of such examinations, and use thereafter, is
also delineated in North Dakota by statute.54 The law requires an
exchange of reports by any experts either side expects to call.55
The reports of any mental health professional or other expert fur-
nished by the defendant may not be used at trial unless the mental
health professional, or other expert who prepared the report, has
been called to testify by the defendant.5 "
When you first meet a battered woman who has killed, she
won't say much. You are likely to see her in a hospital room or a
jail cell. Her eyes will be directed to the floor, and you can feel in
her nonresponsiveness, "How can any lawyer help me now?" She
feels the police have not helped her, the social service people have
not, her clergyman did not, and neither did her family, friends or
neighbors. She thinks: I killed him. I loved him, but I killed him.
That's it.
Sometimes law enforcement reaction to domestic violence
borders on bizarre. In one recent spouse-killing case in North
Dakota, State v. Vogel,57 the defendant was taken first to the hospi-
tal, then to the police station. After interrogation and extraction of
some admissions, she was released. She stumbled down the dark-
ened streets toward her home some three miles away. It was 4:00
a.m. She was alone. She had just killed her husband and was in a
state of shock, yet she was let out the front door of the police sta-
tion unattended.
Battered women do act logically, but it does not appear so.
This is what the defense of battered women is all about. Since
jurors think about self-defense in traditional male stereotypes of
when self-defense is justified, the defense of a battered woman
involves an effort to engineer a quantum leap in juror conscious-
ness in just a few short hours of actual courtroom testimony.
After the defendant has given notice of her intention to raise a
diminished mental capacity defense, the usual procedure in North
Dakota is for the court to order that the defendant be committed
to the North Dakota State Hospital for at least thirty days for pur-
poses of a state-conducted examination.
During this time, a standard procedure is followed that
includes: (1) a complete physical examination to determine
whether there is organic brain damage or other physiological
54. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-04.1-07 to -10 (1985).
55. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-04.1-11 (1985).
56. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-04.1-12 (1985).
57. State v. Vogel, No. 7276 (N.D. Dist. Ct. Nov. 8, 1989).
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cause, (2) a psychological interview and battery of tests, (3) a social
history interview usually by a social worker, (4) a psychiatric inter-
view by a staff psychiatrist, (5) observation in the ward during daily
living routine-recorded in staff shift notes, (6) a conference in
which the defendant meets with the psychiatrist and representa-
tives of the various sections within the institution, (7) a staffing con-
ference in which there are staff discussions and recommendations
concerning the report that will be returned to the court, and (8) a
final report by the psychiatrist to the court.
Before the defendant presents herself to these health care
workers, she needs to be fully prepared so that she understands
the procedure to be followed and how the material will be used
after it has been gathered and organized. She needs to know that
everything she says may be used against them.
Unless the defense counsel also holds degrees in psychology
and psychiatry, he would be wise to retain the assistance of mental
health professionals in this early stage of the procedure. Indeed,
when working with someone who has a long history of being bat-
tered, it may take months for her to be able to freely discuss the
experiences she has just come through. It would be foolish for a
defense lawyer to think he can muster in a few jail interviews such
powers of persuasion as to overcome the psychological scars that
have been inflicted. With assistance of professionals and many
hours of patient interview, a picture will emerge which will give
direction and clues to the multitude of other resources and custo-
dians of essential defense information.
It will also prepare the defendant for a more complete
debriefing when she arrives at the state hospital. This historical
picture leads to a wealth of information from neighbors, friends,
family, in-laws, military personnel, former spouses, law enforce-
ment personnel and files, battered women shelters, clergy, schools,
hospitals, treatment centers, support groups and others who have
had contact with the defendant and the deceased. Written reports
and interviews and the files of all these sources need to be
obtained and compiled into a presentation for the state's mental
health professional as well as for the defendant's own retained
expert. At the state hospital, the task of summarizing this informa-
tion usually falls upon a social worker who compiles the state's ver-
sion of the "social history." All of the underlying information
submitted to the state hospital becomes a part of the patient file.
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The terrible concern expressed in State v. HennuM 58 for pre-trial
Fifth Amendment rights to remain silent should be considered
and discussed with the defendant, but it may very well be that in a
majority of battered woman murder cases, that right should be
abandoned.
When the psychiatrist from the clinic or state hospital comes
to court to testify, one can usually expect the testimony will be
that the patient does not lack substantial capacity to comprehend
the harmful nature or consequence of her conduct and that her
conduct was not the result of any loss or serious distortion of her
capacity to recognize reality. 9 Rule 705 of the North Dakota
Rules of Evidence then permits cross-examination, and a subpoena
will bring the patient's entire state hospital file into the courtroom.
If the state's expert is asked whether she relied upon the phys-
ical or medical examination, she will tell you yes. If you ask why,
you will be told of the importance of ruling out organic causes for
the defendant's behavior.
58. 441 N.W.2d 793 (Minn. 1989).
59. Section 12.1-04.1-01 of the North Dakota Century Code defines the standard for
lack of criminal responsibility in North Dakota as follows:
1. An individual is not criminally responsible for criminal conduct if, as a result
of mental disease or defect existing at the time the conduct occurs:
a. The individual lacks substantial capacity to comprehend the harmful
nature or consequences of the conduct, or the conduct is the result of a
loss or serious distortion of the individual's capacity to recognize reality;
and
b. It is an essential element of the crime charged that the individual act
willfully.
2. For purposes of this chapter, repeated criminal or similar antisocial conduct,
or impairment of mental condition caused primarily by voluntary use of
alcoholic beverages or controlled substances immediately before or
contemporaneously with the alleged offense, does not constitute in itself
mental illness or defect at the time of the alleged offense. Evidence of the
conduct or impairment may be probative in conjunction with other
evidence to establish mental illness or defect.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-04.1-01 (1985). Section 12.1-02-02 of the North Dakota Century
Code defines the words of culpability used in the diminished capacity statute as follows:
1. For the purposes of this title, a person engages in conduct:
a. "Intentionally" if, when he engages in the conduct, it is his purpose to do
so.
b. 'Knowingly" if, when he engages in the conduct, he knows or has a firm
belief, unaccompanied by substantial doubt, that he is doing so, whether
or not it is his purpose to do so.
c. "Recklessly" if he engages in the conduct in conscious and clearly unjus-
tifiable disregard of a substantial likelihood of the existence of the rele-
vant facts or risks, such disregard involving a gross deviation from
acceptable standards of conduct, except that, as provided in section 12.1-
04-02, awareness of the risk is not required where its absence is due to
self-induced intoxication.
e. "Willfully" if he engages in the conduct intentionally, knowingly, or
recklessly.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-02-02 (1985).
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The state's expert will also acknowledge the essential and vital
nature of the psychological examination and testing. She will tell
you that without the social history, the examination would be defi-
cient and challengeable and that it is an extremely important, inte-
gral and mandatory part of any valid comment on mental
condition. She will attest to the importance of the observations
made by the ward nurses and staff as they observed the defendant
"in group" and in routine living during the thirty-day period of the
examination. Of course, the expert will support the importance of
her own examinations and of the "give and take" obtained from
the entire staff in the staffing conference prior to preparation of a
written report for the court.
Rule 705 of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence provides that
on cross-examination the defendant is entitled to elicit the bases
and information upon which an expert arrives at a final opinion. 0
Since the expert has already explained to the jury the importance
of the social history and has certified that she heavily relied upon
the information contained in that social history, the entire social
history becomes available, together with all underlying data sup-
plied to the social worker who prepared the summary for the staff.
Nothing can be more effective on behalf of a battered defend-
ant than to have the state's psychiatric expert forced on the wit-
ness stand to relate the biographical and background history of the
defendant, which converts her from a heartless, cold-blooded
killer of a husband to the tragic figure sitting before them. She
was once abused as a child. She lost siblings to drowning or fire.
She experienced mental torture and repeated physical beatings,
illnesses, and hospitalizations. She sought the help of every con-
ceivable community resource before arriving at the decision that
she was being murdered by her lover on the installment plan, and
she must do it now, even as he sleeps, because she has reached the
last installment.
The expert for the state will tell the jury no certifiable mental
illness could be found. But the social history is what interests the
jurors. Unless the state's expert provides this history fairly, she
appears biased against the defendant. She is not some hired gun
for the defense telling the jurors these things. She is the state's
60. Rule 705 of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence provides as follows:
The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give reasons therefor
without previous disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless the court
requires otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to disclose the
underlying facts or data on cross-examination.
N.D.R. EVID. 705.
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expert telling the jurors these things so heavily relied upon in
arriving at the final opinion.
It is harmful to the prosecution if its expert acknowledges
reviewing and reading all this information but says it was not used.
Could a jury ever rely upon the conclusions of a psychiatrist who
first says the social history is imperative and then attempts to
ignore it, explain it away, or claim it was not significant.
CONCLUSION
If the defendant is truly a "battered woman," her biographical
information most certainly contains a wealth of incidents which, as
a composite, make her perception of the need to take action to
preserve her own life understandable.
In the defense of such persons, one must be concerned that
the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent is explained and pre-
served, but ultimately the defense is based on speaking and not on
silence. Usual concerns about showing one's hand to the opposi-
tion in advance may not apply, and the use of the state's own wit-
nesses to present massive biographical, medical and social history
is a tried, tested and proven vehicle for gaining acquittals for bat-
tered women who have killed. The important part of any such
defense is getting the story told. Great obstacles are created by a
culture and a legal system oriented to a historically male view of
self-defense. One should not be too sensitive to academic objec-
tions of diminished capacity as a defense in some quest for theoret-
ical purity. In the real world, jurors will decide not whether she
was mentally ill but whether or not the defendant got a raw deal
in life and had the right to do what she did.
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